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Abstract 
 
Research shows that political and criminal violence cluster spatially but neglects the 
wide range of mechanisms driving contagion and, more importantly, the role of 
counter-contagion efforts. After identifying permissive conditions for piracy, I 
hypothesize that piracy clusters in locations conducive to successful attacks. Pirates 
engage in risk-reducing behaviour: they return to areas where they have been 
previously successful but also adapt this learning-based decision to constraints 
imposed by EU counter-piracy. The analysis relies on uniquely detailed data on 
piracy and counter-piracy in monthly grid-cells off Somalia (2005-2013). Results 
show that although successful attacks foster more attacks and contagion, EU 
counter-piracy reduces contagion. Even within most successful locations, rescue 
operations reduce incidence of piracy by 89% in the following month. The article 
contributes to existing contagion/diffusion literature by identifying specific channels of 
contagion (contiguity and learning) and by factoring in containment policies that can 
limit and reduce criminal and political violence. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Contagiousness is a feature of many social and political phenomena, including 
conflict, terrorism, protests and crime. Research on violence finds that not only 
violence clusters in space but it also spreads geographically. Whether this occurs as 
effect of contiguity, competition, learning, emulation or other diffusion mechanisms is 
less commonly investigated. Among several typologies of organized crimes, 
maritime piracy has emerged as a global threat to international security. Piracy 
incidents are reported all over the world, from South-East Asia and Indian Ocean to 
Latin America and Caribbean. Yet the distribution of piracy incidents appears to 
exhibit geographical concentration; indeed, a map of incidents easily identifies 
hotspots of pirates’ activity. Recognizing the presence of crime hotspots, however, 
does not indicate diffusion or contagion per se and cannot explain why spatial 
clustering emerges. Research has shown that piracy clusters not only in space but 
also in time (Marchione and Johnson 2013), thus pointing towards not just clustering 
but actual contagion processes.1 However, two question still stands, namely (1) 
under which conditions piracy diffuses and (2) whether military intervention is apt to 
contain contagion.  
As first contribution, I provide answers to these questions showing that pirates 
return to location they are familiar with and move around their proximity. This is what 
I call contagion by reinforcement and contiguity. In addition to this, pirates assess 
likelihood of success based on previous achievements. This is the third contagion 
mechanism, which works through learning. A counter-piracy force, however, may 
limit the geographical diffusion of criminal activities by threatening to or actually 
imposing costs on criminals. More precisely, deterrence and compellence counter 
not only piracy occurrence but also its contagion. The inclusion of contagion 
3 
 
inhibitors is the second distinctive contribution of the manuscript and improves the 
comprehensiveness of the contagion mechanisms under investigation. I use unique 
data on counter-piracy that matches when, where and which incidents resulted in a 
response from the EU Navy operation (EUNAVFOR) and how pirates subsequently 
adjusted to this. Focusing on the Somali case, this manuscript argues that pirates’ 
strategic behaviour helps explaining the spatial pattern of attacks and possible 
contagion. My argument implies that pirates’ decision-making is strategic and 
dependent on their previous history of attacks and assessments of success. Third, 
the manuscript contributes to the existing literature on spatial contagion by taking 
advantage of studying contagion and counter-contagion dynamics in an environment 
with few confounders. On-land phenomena may pose more challenges as they are 
the result of social interactions and micro dynamics that are more difficult to capture. 
Thus, it is more straightforward to account for few confounders at sea and explore 
whether other factors (e.g. learning) have strategic value in decision-making of 
criminal actors. Therefore, the findings presented here provide further evidence that 
strategic decisions by violent and criminal actors lead to spread of their activities. 
This is not the first attempt to detect contagion of piracy (see Marchione and 
Johnson 2013), but it is the first one conceptualizing contagion as a process and 
thus proposing explanations for why we see contagion as an outcome (Elkins and 
Simmons 2005). 
The manuscript is organized as follows. First, I summarize the main scholarly 
contributions on spatial contagion , particularly in the study of violence and crime. In 
the theoretical section, I argue that attacks by pirates are not completely random and 
that some locations are potentially preferred not only because of location-specific 
risk factors (e.g. distance from coast or weather conditions), but also because of 
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pirates’ experience of successes and disruptions by EUNAVFOR counter-piracy in 
that location. To test these hypotheses, I propose a statistical analysis of piracy and 
counter-piracy efforts in Somalia from 2005 to 2013. Results corroborate 
contagiousness of piracy as predicted by the reinforcement, contiguity and learning 
hypotheses on contagion. Additionally, I find that the deployment of the EU mission 
has overall curbed the incidence of piracy off Somalia in recent years (deterrence) 
and that pirates avoid areas where EUNAVFOR disrupted their attacks 
(compellence), though this effect only lasts one month. The conclusion discusses the 
relevance of piracy for understanding the contagion of violence and (transnational 
organized) crime and how identifying different mechanisms of contagion or diffusion 
should lead to different policy interventions.  
 
SPATIAL DIFFUSION AND CONTAGION OF VIOLENCE AND CRIME 
Early political science studies on diffusion paid particular attention to the 
spread of violence. Starr and Most (1985) indicate reinforcement and diffusion as 
possible processes through which war spreads across countries. Intuitively, they 
argue that  countries are at greater  risk of war if they have experienced war in the 
past or are proximate to other countries at war. Braithwaite and Li (2007) also finds 
that countries located in terrorist hotspots are more likely to experience terrorist 
attacks in the immediate future.  
The connections among countries may be defined by different criteria, one of 
which is geographic proximity. Contiguity provides the opportunity for inter-state 
interactions, which facilitate the diffusion of violence across countries (Braithwaite 
2006; Lake and Rothchild 1998). While proximity plays a role in the diffusion of 
phenomena or adoption of policies, it is not the only channel (Buhaug and Gleditsch 
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2008; Braithwaite 2010; Zhukov 2012). Alliances, shared membership in IGO, 
intergovernmental ties, migration flows and even civilization lines are alternative 
channels through which phenomena, as infections, spread faster than proximity 
would predict (Bove and Böhmelt 2016; Most and Starr 1989; Neumayer and 
Plümper 2010; Zhukov and Stewart 2013). For example, Midlarsky et al (1980) argue 
that the risk terrorism contagion depends on the diplomatic status of the country 
where terrorism occurs since status indicates a degree of “imitability”. Indeed, non-
state actors e.g. terrorists and criminals, observe how other groups and the results of 
such actions; according to what they see, they decide whether to adopt the tactic or 
not (Elkins and Simmons 2005). Observing who adopts a strategy and its outcome 
implies a learning process. Learning, in opposition to mimicry, emulation and 
imitation, involves a rationalist adoption of a practice based on its observed 
consequences and consistency with one’s own objectives.2 Also, likelihood of 
adopting a tactic such as suicide terrorism largely depends on the capability of a 
group to do so (Horowitz 2010). Notably, however, while for military strategies like 
suicide bombings capability is a significant constraints, pirates do not incur in major 
costs when deciding to move to locations where attacks are more successful.  
 
Insurgents and terrorists are not the only non-state actors whose activities 
diffuse via contagion and learning. Crime is as infectious as violence and terrorism 
(Cohen and Tita 1999; Ye and Wu 2011).  Criminology has developed its own 
theoretical framework to explain the spatial distribution of crimes which distinguishes 
two mechanisms, namely flag and boost effects (Pease 1998). Some victims 
“advertise their vulnerability” (Johnson and Bowers 2004:12), for example, a house 
with poor lighting is a potential target for any burglar. This heterogeneity in risk is at 
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the core of the flag effect. The second mechanism driving crime diffusion is the boost 
effect, namely the tendency of offenders to learn from their previous crimes and use 
this information to choose future targets. Burglars are likely to return to previously 
robbed houses because they have knowledge of the environment and consequently 
may feel confident to operate more efficiently.  
 
Political Science and Criminology have used different terms and methods to 
explore similar mechanisms behind patterns of diffusion. As argued below, 
compared to Criminology, the so-called Galton’s Problem of distinguishing risk 
heterogeneity from spatial interdependence (Galton 1889) is more explicitly 
addressed in the violence and terrorism literature, both theoretically and 
methodologically. Conversely, research on crime contagion identifies hotspots 
without distinguishing whether these result from spatial distribution of crime-prone 
features (i.e. common exposure3) or actual contagion of crime. As Buhaug and 
Gleditsch (2008) pointed out, hotspots of conflicts may also be the result of 
countries’ individual characteristics that cluster in space, rather than a 
neighbourhood effect. This clustering could emerge not as consequence of 
interdependence among units but more as consequence of Tobler’s first law of 
geography according to which closer things are more similar than distant things 
(Tobler 1970).   
This distinction between spatial interdependence and spatial heterogeneity or 
common exposure (Franzese and Hayes 2008) is crucial as it has theoretical and 
methodological implications. First of all, arguing that the geographical clustering of 
conflict is only the result of the distribution of countries’ features supports the 
conclusion that, for example, terrorism in neighbouring countries is not a threat for 
7 
 
other states. Second, if there is an actual neighbourhood effect (diffusion or 
contagion), non-independence of observations is a problem for statistical inference. 
This manuscript acknowledges these issues and connects the Criminology and 
Political Science literatures using piracy as instance of transnational violent crime to 
pin down contagion and counter-contagion mechanisms underlying the geography of 
piracy. 
 
RISK FACTORS OF MARITIME PIRACY IN SOMALIA 
Identifying factors that affect the occurrence of piracy is important for separating 
contagion (spatial interdependence) from common exposure (clustering of risk 
factors). The literature on the occurrence of piracy adopts an aggregated perspective 
and identifies three classes of risk factors.  
First, states’ institutional capacity affects the intensity of piracy activities within 
states’ territorial waters. Scholars have argued for a non-linear relationship, with 
weak states being more likely to be affected by endemic piracy than failed states 
(Groot, et al 2011; Hastings 2009). More sophisticated typologies of piracy require 
some degree of governance and are threatened by instability caused by violent 
conflicts and anarchy (Shortland and Percy 2013). Daxecker and Prins (2013) 
qualified this finding specifying that the non-linearity holds only for extreme, rare 
cases of state fragility.  
Second, economic conditions affect the cost-opportunity for individuals 
deciding to join the piracy business. These economic conditions include both the 
availability of opportunities in the fishery sector and, more generally, macro 
fluctuation of capital-intensive and labour-intensive commodities (Daxecker and 
Prins 2013; Jablonski and Oliver 2012). Finally and intuitively, geographical and 
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meteorological circumstances affect the risk of piracy. The seasonality of adverse 
weather conditions suggests that also piracy has seasonal variation particularly in 
Somalia, where summer and winter monsoons make waters extremely rough and 
dangerous (Hansen 2009; Percy and Shortland 2013). Among geographical factors, 
proximity to the coast (access to safe havens) and chokepoints are additional 
favourable conditions (Chalk and Hansen 2012).  
Differently from existing work, this manuscript makes an additional step and 
focuses on factors affecting pirates’ decision-making instead of aggregate patterns of 
piracy. While I recognize and account for the importance of aggregate-level factors, I 
aim at exploring more localized manifestations of the phenomenon and the precise 
location of each single attack. Using sea locations as observation unit also allows to 
isolate more convincingly the role of experience and learning from land-based 
features associated with piracy. While conflict violence can explain why pirates 
select certain areas as safe havens, the effect of conflict on crimes perpetrated at 
sea should be less and less important as pirates move away from shores. 
 
Alongside these aggregate factors, the first decision for pirates involves 
selecting the location where they want to search for targets. This decision is based 
on a set of characteristics broadly defined as contextual. Contextual features 
describe the risk of operating in a location. For pirates, location matters more than 
targets’ features since targets are not fixed. While burglars can select a house and 
repeatedly victimize it, pirates rarely attack the same ship. This does not imply that 
pirates do not select targets at all, but before assessing how easy it would be to 
board the ship that is sailing in front of them (e.g. does it have ladders?), pirates 
have to decide which areas to scout (Hansen 2009). Pirates hold beliefs on the 
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feasibility of attacks in several locations, and these beliefs are partly based on their 
previous experience. Assessment on vessels’ level of security is contingent on 
whether one is ever spotted. It is not surprising, then, that pirates often operate in the 
same areas, as Figure 1 shows for the Somali case. Most incidents attributed to 
Somali pirates occur in specific areas rather than being scattered throughout the 
Western Indian Ocean. Figure 1 also illustrates that the Gulf of Aden is not the only 
dangerous area for vessels. Of course the chokepoint at Bab-el Mandeb forces ships 
to travel along a limited area, thus making pirates more likely to hit nearby locations 
and, consequently, hotspots more likely to emerge (Coggins 2012; Chalk 2009; 
Shortland 2015). However, not only the density of attacks extends well beyond the 
Gulf’s entrance, but also areas in the larger Somali Basin experience intense piracy 
activity. This pushes for further investigation since clustering is not simply explained 
by favourable geography and may be the result of strategic choices made by pirates. 
 
To summarize, quality of governance, economic opportunities, geography and 
weather reveal something about the aggregate risk of piracy but fail to explore the 
contagion of piracy. Some areas are more vulnerable than others, but high risk does 
not imply interdependence of events occurring in nearby units. The explanations in 
the literature are best conceived as permissive conditions that precede incidents, but 
there are also consequences of incidents that affect future (and nearby) events 
(Morenoff et al., 2001: 523). These consequences embed event-dependency and 
are the focus of the mechanisms driving the contagion of piracy. 
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Figure 1. Kernel Density of Attacks from 2005 to 2013 
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SPATIAL PATTERNS OF PIRACY IN SOMALIA 
Piracy is not so different from car theft or burglary: it is also an acquisitive crime, but 
with transnational and organized characteristics (UNODC 2010). Whether it involves 
robbing, hijacking or kidnapping, pirates engage in an illicit behaviour aimed at 
acquiring money or valuables from a victim (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). As with 
other classes of crime, spatial analyses of piracy find clear evidence of regularities in 
the location of incidents (Marchione and Johnson 2013).  
Why should we expect piracy to be contagious? A common strategy for Somali 
pirates is to select a geographical area and launch several attacks within a short 
period of time (Hansen 2009). These boosts in piracy incidents begin in areas known 
to pirates, their “hunting grounds” (Hansen 2009:22; Bahadur 2011: 141; De Wijk, 
Anderson, and Haines 2010). The campaigns may have varying duration, but if this 
tactic is common to all pirates’ groups in Somalia, a pattern of spatially and 
temporally interdependent incidents should emerge. As described by Hansen 
(2009:22): 
 
The pirates began to initiate pirating campaigns, a multitude of attacks 
within a short time span often in a limited geographical sectors […] 
scouting and selecting opportune targets within their “hunting grounds”, 
and returning to their bases when they ran out of supplies and patience. 
 
Contrary to what is commonly thought about pirates selecting targets in advance, 
attacks are more based on patrolling instead of intentionally pursuing specific 
vessels (Hansen 2009). Roger Middelton, Chatham House expert, paralleled piracy 
to “walking down the street, looking through windows: you see one that has a single 
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glazing so you smash the window, go in and steal the TV” (Bahadur 2011:54). 
Patrolling, however, does not mean that pirates wander at sea waiting for vessels to 
find them. Instead, those anecdotes suggest, pirates patrol specific location based 
on what they have learnt from previous campaigns. Hence, acting as rational 
hunters, pirates attempt to maximize profit with the least effort, namely by reducing 
travelling time and increasing the likelihood of success. One of the factors explaining 
the return of pirates is familiarity and knowledge of the environment. More 
knowledge and familiarity increases the likelihood that pirates will return to the same 
locations and its surroundings as this information is used to reduce uncertainty and 
increase expectations of success. This strategic calculus should result in patterns of 
reinforcement (i.e. return to same location) and spatial contagion to nearby locations. 
Consequently, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
 
H1a: The intensity of piracy in a location is positively associated to incidents in the 
previous month (contagion by reinforcement). 
H1b: The intensity of piracy in a location is positively associated to previous incidents 
in neighbouring locations (contagion by contiguity). 
 
In addition to reinforcement and contiguity, pirates can use information from the 
outcomes of previous attacks to inform future selection of locations. This mechanism 
implies learning from experience. As in a Bayesian learning process, actors 
accumulate new information consistent with a previously hypothesized relationship 
(Dobbin et al. 2007:460). As in the case of burglars, if offenders assess a high rate of 
success in a given area, then they are more likely to return. Information about 
previous successes is immediately available to the pirates that actually carried out 
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attacks. Besides within-group learning, other groups could gather the same 
information and learn by observing other groups. If these groups succeed, observers 
are encouraged to adopt the same behaviour, in this case increasing piracy activity 
in proximity of locations with higher rates of success. There is evidence of links 
among pirate groups, supporting the hypothesis that they might learn from each 
other’s practices. Piracy networks are fluid; some overlap and occasionally 
cooperate (Monitoring Group on Somalia 2008). The two main pirates networks of 
Somalia, namely the Puntland and the Hobyo-Hardheere networks, have 
collaborated since 2005 and some senior pirates also travelled around Somalia as 
instructors and head-hunters (Eichstaedt 2010; Hansen 2009). Cooperation and 
overlapping membership favour the flow of information among groups and support 
the hypothesis that pirates learn not only from their own experience but also 
observing other groups’ successes.4  
The tacit coordination among pirate groups also explains why success would 
not lead to competition and thus dispersion rather than concentration of attacks. As 
groups learn about each others’ successes, we could expect that more groups will 
end up operating in the same area; competition over scarce resources may drive to 
two possible scenarios. One, pirate groups will fight over specific areas.  The 
coordination mechanisms mentioned above reduce competition and are often 
enforced by clan elders (Hansen 2009). For example, pirates are forbidden to re-
hijacked released vessels on their way off Somalia (Shortland and Varese 2016). 
More likely, pirate groups will operate in those locations that are just proximate to 
those known to be successful, both to avoid frictions with other groups and to avoid 
attracting EU navy attention by overcrowding shipping lanes with pirates skiffs. So 
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pirates will prefer operating in nearby areas (thus contagion will occur) and not 
precisely in the same exact area where successful attacks occurred. 
Both within- and between-group learning are relevant and expected to have 
the same effect on piracy incidence. I propose the following hypothesis on learning: 
  
H1c: The intensity of piracy in a location is positively associated with rates of 
success in the same location and its surroundings (contagion by learning) 
 
If Hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c find empirical support, it can be argued that location and 
timing of piracy attacks are strategically selected instead of being opportunistic and 
completely unplanned. All three hypotheses outline decision mechanisms that 
explain different parts of the spatio-temporal clustering of piracy incidents found in 
the literature. As will be clarified in the operationalization of the variables, the crucial 
difference between H1b and H1c is that the former explains contagion as result of 
geographical proximity, while the latter focuses on rational evaluation of previous 
attacks and success rates in each location.  
Another important clarification concerns the null hypothesis. If there are 
several factors that explain clustering besides learning, contiguity, and 
reinforcement, we would see clustering even if no contagion is occurring. This point 
relates, again, to the fundamental Galton’s Problem. If clustering of piracy is still 
present after controlling for risk factors that are similar in nearby units (e.g. distance 
from land), there is likely an interdependent data generating process that needs to 
be modelled. Hence, the main null hypothesis here is “no spatial interdependence” 
rather than “no clustering”, which could still be present in absence of contagion. 
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Indeed, even in absence of interdependence and contagion, we may still observe 
clustering but what occurs in each unit is independent and does not affect others. 
 
Countering Contagion: Counter-Piracy in Somalia 
Contagion is not only instigated by what others do but can also be “inhibited by the 
information [units] receive through time about one another’s behaviour and its 
consequences” (Pitcher et al 1978). Hence, while some factors are expected to 
favour the contagion of piracy (i.e. rate of success in close locations), there are also 
factors that inhibit and contain contagion. One important factor that has potentially 
inhibited pirates’ activity and altered their modus operandi off Somalia is the 
European Union Naval Force Atalanta (EUNAVFOR). EUNAVFOR was established 
in late 2008 to reduce the incidence and contagion of maritime piracy in the Gulf of 
Aden and the Somali basin. The deployment of warships from European countries 
has been extended until December 2018 with the objective of protecting vulnerable 
vessels (especially those carrying food aid), deterring and disrupting piracy and 
monitoring fishing to support international organization which are building maritime 
security and capacity in the area (EUNAVFOR webpage).  
The presence of warships is expected to have a decreasing effect on piracy. I 
distinguish between deterrence and compellence effects. Deterrence occurs when 
an actor is discouraged to initiate an action because he or she fears the threat of 
retaliation; compellence describes a situation where the cost-benefit calculation of 
action is altered after the cost has been imposed (Schelling 1966). I argue that 
EUNAVFOR deployment has both a deterrence effect (overall reduction of attacks 
following the deployment of warships) and a compellence effect (reduction of risk of 
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attacks in location where the navy has imposed costs on pirates by disrupting 
attacks). In line with this, hypotheses on contagion inhibitors are: 
 
H2a: EUNAVFOR patrolling in the Indian Ocean has decreased the risk of piracy 
attacks (deterrence) 
H2b: Rescue intervention reduces the risk of piracy in the same location and its 
nearby (compellence) 
 
ANALYSIS: DATA AND METHOD 
The availability of spatially and temporarily disaggregated data on incidents allows 
for an empirical analysis of micro-level theories of violent actors’ behaviour. In order 
to test the hypotheses on how pirates select locations to perpetrate attacks, I use a 
time-series cross-sectional dataset with grid cells-month as unit of analysis. 
Particularly for the Somali case, most events do not occur in ports but at high sea. 
This introduces the problem of defining what a “location” is at sea since there is no 
natural or administrative boundary separating different areas. The spatial unit I refer 
to with the term “location” is a cell from the PRIO-GRID (Tollefsen et al 2012). The 
PRIO-GRID consists of 0.5x0.5 decimal degrees cells and covers the maritime areas 
where Somali pirates attack vessels. This includes the Somali coast, the Gulf of 
Aden and the Somali basin (see Figure 1). The data include 2,964 cells observed 
monthly from 2005 to 2013, for a total of 320,112 observations. I use months as the 
temporal unit in order to better identify contagion processes and immediate effects of 
counterpiracy. About 10% of the cells (397) experienced at least one attack in the 
period under consideration. Information about attacks location is provided by 
International Maritime Bureau (IMB) and Anti-Shipping Activity Messages(ASAM). 
17 
 
While reporting of attacks in the 1990s was geographically unprecise, reporting 
significantly improved in 2000s. Only 6 out of almost 1,300 incidents off Somalia 
from 2005 to 2013 have no clear geographical reference, thus were excluded. 
Duplicates of incidents reported in both sources were also removed. The analysis 
includes actual and attempted attacks since the main research question focuses on 
pirates’ strategic selection of favourable environments, rather than explanations of 
success. Incidents are self-reported by crew or ship owners; however incentives for 
reporting attacks are likely independent from where they occur, thus should not 
substantially alter geographical patterns. The dependent variable is the monthly 
number of piracy incidents in each cell. 
I first present a logistic regression that estimates the effect of contextual risk 
factors (stability, economic conditions, geographical features, and weather patterns). 
The logit model sets the baseline risk based uniquely on cells’ features, thus the 
model excludes spatial variables. The count models build on this baseline. They only 
include variables that were significant in the logit model with the addition of the 
contagion-related covariates. More specifically, I test hypotheses 1a, 1b and 1c on 
contagion by reinforcement, contiguity and learning using a zero-inflated negative 
binomial (ZINB) to model the intensity of piracy. Hypotheses 2a and 2b on 
counterpiracy are examined thereafter. H2a focuses on deterrence effect in the 
aftermath of EUNAVFOR deployment. To test the compellence in hypothesis 2b, I 
examine the effect of EUNAVFOR actual intervention against pirates to rescue 
vessels rather than EUNAVFOR’s mere presence. Since rescuing operations and 
intensity of piracy are endogenous, I perform a seemingly unrelated estimation 
(SUR) that allows me to combine a ZINB and logistic regression to test hypothesis 
H2b. 
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Main Independent Variables 
Reinforcement, Contagion and Learning 
To measure reinforcement, I use the temporal lag of the dependent variable to test 
the hypothesis that number of incidents in the previous month has a positive effect 
on the likelihood of future ones within the same unit. Second, contagion requires that 
what occurred in a proximate unit j at time t-1 has an effect on the nearby unit i at 
time t. Consequently, I calculate the spatial lag of incidents occurring in neighbouring 
units and also include its time lag. The neighbourhood of a cell is defined by the 
eight contiguous grid cells sharing a border or vertex with the cell. This is called a 
queen matrix of order 1, which means contagion can occur from one cell to any of 
the eight cells immediately adjacent to it.  Third, the learning mechanism implies that 
pirates will operate again around areas where they carried out mostly successful 
attacks. For example, if most attacks near the Gulf of Aden were successful, it is 
more likely that pirates will operate there in the future. I measure the rate of success 
for each cell in the previous month as a simple proportion of actual attacks over the 
total number of incidents in the cell in the previous month. I also calculate the spatial 
lag of success to assess whether there is an increase in attacks nearby successful 
locations.5 
 
Deterrence and Compellence 
Information on the location of EUNAVFOR Atalanta mission ships is not publicly 
available. It is known, however, that locations where EU ships intervened were 
scattered across the Somali basin as shown in Figure 2, suggesting that no matter 
where originally deployed, ships were able to intervene in the whole area under 
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analysis, though not always promptly as some unsuccessful rescues indicate. The 
support of air patrols and drones surveillance along the coast improved the mission’s 
capacity to operate in this vast region. Importantly, pirates are not informed about 
where EUNAVFOR ships are located at different times, so they cannot purposely 
avoid specific areas based on the expectations that warships will be patrolling.  To 
measure deterrence, I thus add a dummy variable for the EUNAVFOR Atalanta 
deployment that takes value of 1 for all grids after 2008. To avoid conflating Atalanta 
with the introduction of Best Management Practices and private security on board, I 
control for these two factors separately (see below on control variables). 
The compellence mechanism suggests that locations where pirates have 
previously confronted EUNAVFOR ships are less likely to be selected for 
subsequent attacks. The EUNAVFOR website provides data on the rescue of 
vessels, but the location of the operation is vague and refers only to Gulf of Aden or 
Somali basin. In order to identify cells where the mission intervened to disrupt an 
ongoing attack, I cross the information reported by the EUNAVFOR on the exact 
date and type of rescued vessels with IMB and ASAM data. Using the exact date 
and type of vessel, I can match incidents with rescues and accordingly locate 
EUNAVFOR interventions.6 I account for pirates’ strategic adaptation after 
confrontation with EU warships by including a time-lagged dummy for grids where 
the EU intervened to rescue a vessel. Linking incidents to rescue is crucial for testing 
EUNAVFOR effectiveness. Jablonski and Oliver (2013) operationalize this variable 
as a count of patrolling vessels, but they cannot actually locate their activities. They 
find no effect for this variable, but since incidents are not linked to international 
counter-piracy efforts it is problematic to completely rule out any effect. In fact, 
Jablonski and Oliver mention that a local deterrent effect can be at place, which is 
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also consistent with the findings in Shortland and Vothknecht (2011). Such local 
effect can only be observed with disaggregated data that previous studies lacked. 
As a summary, Table I reviews hypotheses and operationalizations. 
 
Table I. 
 
HYPOTHESES 
 
Mechanism 
 
Operationalization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H1: Contagion 
 
(a) by Reinforcement: 
More incidents after one occurred in the 
same location i at t-1 
 
𝐷𝑉𝑡−1 
 
(b) by Contiguity: 
More incidents after one occurred in 
neighbouring locations j at t and t-1 
 
𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑗
 
 
𝑊 ∗ 𝐷𝑉𝑡−1
𝑗
 
 
(c) by Learning: 
More incidents if the location or nearby 
have high rate of successful attacks 
(
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
)
𝑡−1
𝑖
 
 
𝑊 ∗ (
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘𝑠
)
𝑡−1
𝑗
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H2: Inhibitors of 
Contagion 
 
(a) Deterrence: 
Less risk of incidents after EUNAVFOR 
deployment 
 
Dummy Atalanta 
 
(b) Compellence: 
Less risk of incidents after confrontation 
with EUNAVFOR 
 
Dummy Rescue t-1 within cell 
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Figure 2. Piracy incidents and EUNAVFOR intervention from December 2008 to 2013 
  
22 
 
 
Control variables 
Most of the control variables are calculated and assigned to each cell using ArcGIS. I 
proxy institutional capacity (strength of local governance and the degree of 
instability) with the number of monthly killings along Somali coast reported in the 
Armed Conflict Location and Event Data project (ACLED, Raleigh et al. 2010).7 I 
expect that both very stable and very unstable territories are associated with fewer 
pirate attacks close to the coast, as posited by the institutional capacity argument. I 
include a square term for this inverse-U relationship. Non-linear effects are also 
expected for measures of distance from ports and density of shipping traffic. Pirates 
will attack more often in areas where many vessels transit, yet too high density may 
be a problem as the crew may call for close ships’ help. Distance from ports should 
also have a non-linear effect. Since pirates try to maximize gain and reduce effort, 
travelling too far is not ideal. Yet, vessels actively avoid the Somali coast. 
Consequently, pirates are forced to move a bit further while still preferring to be as 
close as possible to land. Squared distance from ports and density of traffic are 
included to account for these non-linearities. Distance from ports is calculated with 
ArcGIS while data on shipping density are from the European Commission Maritime 
Forum yet, unfortunately, available only for 2010.8  Because of this limitation, traffic 
density is included in the ZINB inflation stage because locations without transit will 
never experience piracy. Assigning a low probability of attack to locations with low 
traffic is the best way to make use of available information on sailing vessels. I also 
include a dummy for cells within 200 nautical miles from the Bab-el-Mandeb 
chokepoint and a dummy for monsoon seasons (South-West monsoon in summer 
and North-East in winter). To show that piracy is also a function of labour 
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opportunities, I interact the monsoon season with a dummy for the Gulf of Aden; 
more specifically, the growth in fishing production brought by the summer monsoon 
in the Somali Basin should reduce piracy in this area but less pronouncedly in the 
Gulf of Aden. Finally, the introduction of Best Management Practices (BMP) 
document in 2009 and on-board private security can also be argued to have had an 
impact on the intensity of piracy off Somalia. I use EUNAVFOR data to calculate the 
time lagged number of rescued vessels that implemented BMP and the number of 
vessels with private security on board for each cell-month.  
 
Estimation and Results 
Before focusing on the ZINB model, Model 1 in Table II reports the logit model 
including only the control variables and the time lag of the dependent variable. This 
model identifies the baseline risk of experiencing one attack in a grid cell-month. 
Most variables behave as hypothesized. Shipping density is associated positively 
with incident occurrence; hence the likelihood of piracy is higher where there are 
more potential targets available. Increasing distance from ports reduces the odds of 
attacks. The square term for traffic density and distance, however, is not significant. 
Being in proximity of the Bab el-Mandeb strait is also very risky for vessels as it is 
easier for pirates to identify target, attack and then quickly escape to the coast. 
Higher density of traffic in these areas also allows pirates to choose more vulnerable 
targets. Meteorological conditions also affect the risk of attacks, though only the 
South-Western monsoon curbs piracy, while the winter monsoon has no significant 
impact. Because of its intensity and high temperature, coastal communities benefit 
from the summer monsoon; its upwelling increases the presence of sea nutrient and 
makes fishing more attractive than going out at high sea to rob or hijack vessels 
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(Wiebinga et al 1997). The interaction term between summer monsoon and the Aden 
region shows that risk of incidents is lower during the summer monsoon but this 
effect is more moderate in the Gulf of Aden. Here the increased marine productivity 
is half than in the Somali basin so, as consequence, fishery does not sufficiently 
substitute for piracy nor it increases the opportunity cost of using boats for piracy 
instead of fishery. Hence, few attacks still occur. Finally, the number of battle-related 
deaths along Somali coasts measures the degree of instability and local governance. 
According to the results, instability but not complete chaos provides advantages for 
illicit activities such as piracy. The baseline model confirms that quality of 
governance, economic opportunities, weather and geographic factors affect the 
location of attacks not only at the state level. 
The logit model neglects the contagion mechanisms and does not disentangle 
simple geographic clustering from actual contagion. It also does not account for how 
many times locations experience piracy. As main model, I estimate a ZINB to explore 
channels of contagion. There are locations with very low or even zero chances of 
attacks, for example if vessels never cross that cell. Now, what explains immunity 
from piracy is likely different what explains concentration of piracy. The ZINB models 
these two processes separately9, differently from count models such as negative 
binomial (NB). For comparison, I report also the results from a NB model in Table II 
(Model 2); all key statistics (AIC, BIC and Vuong test) suggest that the ZINB model 
perform significantly better than the NB, although the point estimates are not very 
different.  My decision to select the ZINB model relies on both statistical and 
theoretical reasons. First, I believe that shipping density affects both intensity and 
probability that an incident will ever occur in a location. This is effectively modelled 
by the ZINB. Second, the seemingly small differences between NB and ZINB (which 
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nonetheless are statistically important in terms of goodness-of-fit) do tell us 
something about the proposed theory of piracy contagion, namely that locations with 
high number of attacks do not have specific features that differentiate them from 
locations with extremely low risk. 
ZINB estimates are shown in Model 3 (Table II).  The covariate for the 
inflation equation is shipping density: locations where vessels never transit are 
expected to be less (if never) targeted. Also, mechanisms of contagion by 
reinforcement, contiguity and learning are tested in this model. The increase in 
expected count of incidents after at least one occurred in the previous month is 
indicative of a reinforcement process. The intensity of attacks increases 211% when 
an attack already occurred in the same location (Table III). If the attack occurred in 
surrounding locations, the intensity is heightened by 152%, meaning the number of 
attacks more than doubles. The significance of the spatial lag and the non-
significance of the spatio-temporal lag suggest that this neighbourhood effect occurs 
in the short run, namely within the same month. Incidents that occurred in the 
surroundings are not affecting the intensity of piracy in the following months. This is 
likely the result of short campaigns often carried out by Somali pirates that generate 
chains of attacks close in space within a short period. Near-repeat analysis 
discussed below confirms this interpretation.  
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Table II. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
 
 
 
Logit 
 
 
NB 
 
ZINB 
Main Model 
 
   NB Inflation 
     
Reinforcement 2.751*** 1.257*** 1.135***  
 (0.184) (0.348) (0.333)  
Contiguity(𝑡 − 1)  0.143 0.110  
  (0.125) (0.118)  
Contiguity  0.993*** 0.928***  
  (0.121) (0.114)  
Rate of Success(𝑡 − 1) (Space lag)  4.856*** 4.790***  
  (1.411) (1.358)  
Rate of Success(𝑡 − 1)  0.882** 0.905**  
  (0.396) (0.356)  
Density 0.054*** 0.037*** 0.004 -1.715*** 
 (0.017) (0.009) (0.014) (0.433) 
Density (sq) -0.001 -0.0004 -0.0001  
 (0.001) (0.0003) (0.0001)  
Distance ports -0.07** -0.039 -0.037  
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.034)  
Distance ports (sq) -0.003 -0.004** -0.005**  
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  
Chokepoint 1.185*** 0.843*** 0.771***  
 (0.215) (0.197) (0.213)  
Summer monsoon -1.160*** -0.593*** -0.592***  
 (0.180) (0.112) (0.112)  
Winter monsoon -0.036    
 (0.1)    
Gulf of Aden -0.540***    
 (0.199)    
Summer monsoon*Aden 1.031***    
 (0.228)    
Winter monsoon*Aden 0.076    
 (0.139)    
Killed(𝑡 − 1) 3.691*** 2.808*** 2.821***  
 (0.531) (0.692) (0.674)  
Killed(𝑡 − 1) (sq) -1.781*** -1.343*** -1.349***  
 (0.264) (0.343) (0.335)  
Constant -6.938*** -6.875*** -6.171*** 0.479** 
 (0.327) (0.322) (0.320) (0.241) 
     
Observations 320,112 320,112 320,112 
LnAlpha   1.797*** 1.514*** 
Vuong Statistics   4.75*** 
10,720 
10,891 
 
AIC  10,816    
BIC  10,965 
Clustered Standard Errors 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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A third contagion mechanism suggests that pirates learn for previous attacks and 
return to locations where more successful attacks were carried out. The model 
supports this explanation, as the positive and significant coefficients for the learning 
variables show. A 10% increase in the rate of success results in 9% more incidents 
in that unit and, more importantly, 62% more in the surrounding locations. The 
control variables retain significance and direction as estimated in the logit and NB 
models, except for density, which is only significant in the inflation equation. As 
expected, less trafficked areas are important predictors of no incidents, meaning 
they are not selected by pirates.10 
Figure 3 plots the probability of an attack after one has occurred in nearby 
cells, as estimated by the ZINB. The likelihood of attacks increases as more 
incidents occur in the surrounding units, regardless of whether the cell has already 
experienced an attack in the previous time period. The risk of piracy is higher when 
both surrounding units and the location itself were targeted previously (solid line, 
approximately 3%) but is halved when only neighbouring cells have been previously 
attacked (dashed line, approximately 1.5%). This suggests that piracy both spreads 
to new locations and re-occur in those that already experienced it. Predicted 
probabilities in Figure 4 refer to similar scenarios where pirates have successfully 
carried out attacks in neighbouring units in the previous month. Again, the likelihood 
of piracy increases as success rate grows, and doubles when an incident occurred in 
the previous month too. Note that the highest success rate is 0.75, hence the 
difference between the two lines is significant for most observed variation in the 
sample.   
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Figure 3. Predicted Probability of Piracy after piracy in nearby cells 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  Predicted Probability of Piracy after successful piracy in nearby cells 
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Table III. Incident Rate Ratio (Model 3, 4 and 5) 
 
Mechanism Variable IRR % Change 
Piracy  
 
Reinforcement 
 
Count(𝑡 − 1) 
 
3.111 
 
+211% 
 
Contiguity 
 
Count (Space lag) 
 
2.530 
 
+152% 
 
Learning 
 
Rate of Success(𝑡 − 1) 
(Space lag) 
 
1.049 
 
+61% 
Rate of Success(𝑡 − 1)  1.009 +10% 
 
Deterrence 
 
Atalanta2011 
 
1.3 
 
+30% 
 Atalanta2012 0.507 -49% 
 Atalanta2013 0.123 -88% 
 
Compellence 
 
 
Success(max)*Rescue(𝑡 − 1) 
 
0.51 
 
-89% 
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I explore the finding on the short-term versus long-term contagion by contiguity 
further by moving to a higher level of temporal disaggregation, namely daily variation 
in attacks. Near-repeats analysis can be used to identify daily patterns of contagion. 
Near-repeats are events that occur close in time and space in a non-random way. 
Full results are not included to preserve space (results available upon request), there 
is a clear pattern of near-repeats with the first piracy attack being followed by a rapid 
increase of risk in nearby cells for a short temporal span.11 Indeed, after several 
attacks the risk of getting caught is higher because vessels might have alerted 
authorities so the campaign has to stop. It follows that pirates can carry out multiple 
attacks in close areas for a short period; they will then have to either move away or 
retreat. Figure 5 maps the location of near-repeats. The longest chains (>10 attacks) 
are in the Gulf of Aden, close to the straits. Here, the conjunction of favourable 
geographic conditions probably allows pirates to attack multiple targets in a short 
amount of time (one day interval). 
In sum, results in Table II reveal that piracy spreads in space, also to 
previously immune locations. This contagion is driven not only by spatial contiguity 
but also by a learning process through which pirates update their belief about 
successful areas. The same argument holds for reinforcement, that is to say, the 
expectation that pirates return to locations they are familiar with.  
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Figure 5. Location of incidents occurring within near repeat chains 
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Now, I assess the effect of EU counterpiracy in terms of deterrence and 
compellence (H2a and H2b). The deployment of EU warships for the Atalanta 
mission should alter pirates’ decision-making and contain the contagion of piracy. 
Model 4 (Table IV) tests the effect of EUNAVFOR deployment on the intensity of 
piracy activity using year dummies that equals 1 for years after 2008. Model 4 
reveals that the deterrent effect only started in 2012, with a 49% reduction of monthly 
attacks and became even stronger afterwards, with an 88% decrease in 2013 (Table 
III). Piracy activity off Somalia did not drop immediately after the deployment, but the 
mission became a more effective deterrent later. Indeed, in 2012 EUNAVFOR was 
allowed to expand its operations to Somali territorial waters and coastline and 
established cooperation with the Somali Transnational Federal Government 
(European Council 2012). In May 2012, EUNAVFOR conducted its first  raid against 
a pirates’ base on Somalia’s coast, during which boats and weapons were 
completely destroyed (BBC News 2012). Models with one single dummy variable for 
Atalanta mission (not shown) do not capture this gradual improvement and report a 
positive coefficient. Furthermore, the implementation of BMP and use of on-board 
private security does not significantly reduce attacks, while more likely reduce their 
success. 
Moving to compellence, I test the effect of EU rescue operations on pirates’ 
strategic selection of locations. More specifically, I measure whether pirates faced 
EUNAVFOR in a location in the previous month to test the compellence effect. 
Disrupting attacks does not simply threaten, but actually imposes costs on pirates. 
Since the strategic interaction between pirates’ activity and EU intervention is 
endogenous, I use a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) to test the hypothesis. 
The SUR model estimates two separate equations allowing correlation between 
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disturbances. To ensure consistency with the main model presented earlier (ZINB, 
model 3) the two seemingly unrelated models are a ZINB and a logit model. I expect 
the intensity of piracy to be related to EU activity in given units in the last month; 
hence I use the ZINB with the number of attacks as the dependent variable and 
previous EUNAVFOR rescue interventions as the independent variable. At the same 
time, EU interventions are a function of piracy actually occurring, which is why the 
logit model uses a dummy for EUNAVFOR intervention in the previous month as the 
dependent variable, and the previous number of attacks and success rate as 
covariates. I interact success rates and EU rescues in the ZINB equation because 
compellence can be conditional on learning. If pirates attack a vessel in a cell that 
has 100% failure rate, they are less likely to return to the location independently from 
EUNAVFOR intervention. A compellence effect occurs when successful areas 
become dangerous for pirates because of EU disruption. Indeed, models without the 
interaction term report no significant effect of intervention on future piracy incidents 
(not shown). 
The results are reported in Model 5 (Table IV). The logit estimation shows that 
interventions are strongly and positively related to piracy activity not only in a specific 
unit but also in its proximity. Also rates of success in the location increase the 
probability of EU intervention, suggesting a learning effect also for counterpiracy 
operations. Focusing on the ZINB model, it is interesting to see that the disruption of 
attacks by EUNAVFOR reduces piracy incidence and discourages attacks even 
when the success rate is high. As reported in Table III, when success rate is at its 
maximum, piracy is reduced by 89% by EU intervention. However, this compellence 
only lasts for one month. It disappears after two months as reported by the lags for 
rescue operations carried out at t-2 and t-3. Eventually, pirates go back to that 
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location. This short-term effect has two main reasons.On the one hand, we know 
from the logit equation of the SUR estimation that EUNAVFOR intervenes more in 
areas where more successful attacks occurred. On the other hand, this intervention 
is not followed or complemented by constant patrolling of these areas. After the 
rescue of vessels, warships move away. Thus, it is possible that pirates wait 
approximately one month, according to my analysis, and then again return to these 
areas because of their high success rates. 
The predicted effect of the interaction between success rates and EU 
intervention is plotted in Figure 6. Very interestingly, success increases likelihood of 
contagion only when attacks did not trigger EU rescue (solid line). Indeed, the risk of 
attacks increases from almost 2% to more than 10% when most previous attacks 
were successful and the EU did not disrupt them. Conversely, EUNAVFOR 
interventions decrease probability of piracy spreading to new locations regardless of 
success rates. The dashed line in Figure 6 is indicating that pirates are less likely to 
operate in locations where their success led to EU intervention, even less so when 
they were very successful. A plausible explanation for this is that more effective 
piracy attacks attract much more attention and robust military deployment, thus 
posing significant constraints on pirates’ capacity to operate in such areas in the 
following month. 
 
Robustness and Model Fit 
How much does the inclusion of contagion and counter-contagion variables 
improve predictive performances of a model of piracy risk? Figure 7 plots the 
Receiver-Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves that compare the in-sample  
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Figure 6. Predicted Probability of Piracy after EUNAVFOR intervention against successful attacks 
 
 
predictions of three different piracy models. The larger the area under the curve 
(AUC), the higher the model’s predictive power. The blue curve refers to a  model 
that only includes what I referred to as contextual factors, namely all covariates 
except variables related to contagion and counter-contagion, as listed in Table I. The 
red curve refers to a model that includes variables measuring contagion by contiguity 
and learning. Finally, the green curve refers to the full model where both contagion 
and counter-contagion variables are included. As indicated in the Figure, the 
contagion model already improves the prediction of a simple model where spatial 
interdependences are not accounted for, moving the AUC from 82% to 84%. 
Furthermore, the largest improvement on predictive power results from the inclusion 
of counter-contagion factors, which contributes to a 10-point increase in the AUC 
(94%). Since this is the first study using such spatially and temporally fine-grained 
data, there is no existing model against which I can compare these ROC curves. The 
only available in-sample prediction exercise is provided by Daxecker and Prins 
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(2015). Using country-year as unit of analysis, their model for all piracy incidents has 
an AUC of 92%. While differences in the unit of analysis and geographical scale 
make these results not fully comparable, this still suggests that considering 
contagion and counter-contagion factors increases the in-sample fit of risk models of 
piracy. In addition to this, I map the predicted risk of piracy in the Appendix (Figure 
A.I) to show that the estimated geographic patterns of risk are more similar to the 
observed geography of attacks in the counter-contagion model. Taken together, the 
risk maps in Appendix and the ROC curves corroborate the claim that predictions on 
pirates’ behaviour do improve when models account for both factors that boost and 
contain the spatial spread of piracy. 
In the Appendix, I present additional empirical results to assess the 
robustness of my findings. First, I did not include month or grid cell fixed effects in 
the main model because the ZINB already captures some heterogeneity. Indeed, the 
standard estimation of a ZINB model in Stata does not allow the use of fixed effects. 
In Table A.I (Appendix) however, I show consistent results of a ZINB model with the 
inclusion of month fixed effects. Table A.II shows the estimates of separate ZINB 
models for the contagion variables, and results are comparable to the main model 
presented in the manuscript. In addition, Table A.III reports results using the leads 
for the main independent variables, namely contiguity and learning. The lead of 
reinforcement is simply the dependent variable, since reinforcement is its time lag so 
it is obviously not included. If contagion is occurring, then the lead of the covariates 
driving contagion would have no significant effect on the number of incidents. 
Consistently, I find that leads are not significantly associated with piracy attacks. The 
Appendix also includes robustness tests using only successful piracy attacks (Table 
A.IV), models specification with a dummy variable for the grid-cells within the 
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Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) just outside the Gulf of Aden 
(Table A.V), models with quarterly aggregated data (Table A.VI) and finally models 
with four-month lags of the independent variables. The last two tables in particular 
aim at providing support to the expectation that pirates do return to some locations 
and their surroundings months after the successful attacks and the identified 
contagion patterns are not only the results of a single campaign. Finally, Table A. VIII 
reports the result of a Markov-Chain logit model to provide a more conservative test 
of the contagion process. The model shows that the probability that previously safe 
locations experience piracy is higher when nearby successful attacks are 
perpetrated, while contiguity affects both the likelihood of spread in nearby cells and 
re-occurrence of piracy in the same cell. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
It could be argued that contagion at sea is more challenging to identify compared to 
land-based contagion because socio-economic and environmental drivers of the 
phenomenon are not present on water. This claim seems to misunderstand 
contagion. First, if socio-economic and environmental features are sufficient for 
explaining the spatial and temporal clustering of events, clustering is very likely the 
result of the initial spatial distribution of these features rather than an interdependent 
process of contagion. This is the difference between spatial interdependence and 
common exposure. Second, pirates are very land-based actors and carefully select 
locations to sail from. For example, they seek local tribes’ protection and relatively 
secure ports. Hence, the decision of where to sail from and to is not independent 
from land-based conditions. In other words, piracy occurs at sea but it is not a 
uniquely and purely maritime activity. 
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Another important points concern how confident we can be on mechanisms 
behind contagion of piracy and other forms of violence and crime. Violence during 
civil wars spreads because actors attempt to establish control over contested areas. 
Starting from their home base, each party uses violence in surrounding areas 
whenever necessary to gain relevant territories. In the case of sea-based crime, 
however, is it possible to identify the origin of the contagion? Pirates have to move 
on water to commit attacks and each time they try to identify areas suitable for 
attacks. Possibly, they go back to the last location they operated within and then 
move to its immediate surroundings. Given the availability of GPS and other 
technologies, pirates have at least the opportunity to do so. While conflicts escalate 
or relocate from a point of origin, piracy has no fixed beginning point. For contagion 
patterns to emerge, it is necessary that pirates decide to go in a location to start their 
campaigns. If they simply hunt specific targets, this behaviour would not result in 
spatio-temporal clustering. Once the campaign ends or at least one attack is carried 
out, pirates have to go back to shores again. Then, when a new campaign starts, 
they may decide to go back to already areas that are known and ‘successful’. In this 
sense, the dynamics of Bayesian learning that are used to explain behaviours of 
other violent actors (terrorist or rebel groups), is particularly explicit and strategic in 
pirates’ decision-making. The fact that these actors carry out their attacks at sea 
simply facilitates the isolation of such mechanisms that are more difficult to 
disentangle in land-based phenomenon. The problem of many confounders and 
common exposure, while still of some relevance, should be less severe for the 
inferences made here.
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Table IV. 
 Model (4) Model (5) 
 ZINB 
 
SUR Rescue 
Variables Atalanta ZINB+ Logit 
    
Reinforcement 1.210*** 0.601** 4.696*** 
 (0.335) (0.286) (0.657) 
Contiguity(𝑡 − 1) 0.805*** 0.902***  
 (0.108) (0.120)  
Contiguity 0.0193 0.403***  
 (0.121) (0.0821)  
Rate of Success(𝑡 − 1) 1.128 3.901*** 17.65*** 
 (0.759) (1.049) (1.560) 
Rate of Success(𝑡 − 1) (Space Lag) 4.496***   
 (1.445)   
Atalanta2010 0.214   
 (0.141)   
Atalanta2011 0.261**   
 (0.118)   
Atalanta2012 -0.680***   
 (0.160)   
Atalanta2013 -2.098***   
 (0.261)   
Success(𝑡 − 1)*Rescue(𝑡 − 1)  -7.331***  
  (2.180)  
Rescue(𝑡 − 1)  2.600  
  (0.946)  
Rescue(𝑡 − 2)  1.623***  
  (0.221)  
Rescue(𝑡 − 3)  1.535***  
  (0.202)  
BMP -0.0420 -0.152  
 (0.282) (0.391)  
Private Security -0.122 0.124  
 (0.365) (0.576)  
Constant -2.887*** -5.034*** -8.761*** 
 (0.800) (0.749) (0.405) 
    
Observations 177,840 177,840 177,840 
Clustered standard errors     
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    
+ Inflation stage with Density (***) not reported. 
Other control variables are included in the estimation 
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Figure 7. Receiver-Operating Characteristic Curves for piracy attacks (2005-2013) 
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Moving from existing work on contagion of political and criminal violence, the 
analysis presented here shows that violent actors strategically select location for 
violence and adapt their decision-making according to learning and counter-violence 
factors. Using the case of Somali maritime piracy as strict test of such claims, I show 
that, along with contextual factors that increase the profitability and attractiveness of 
piracy (economic opportunities, instability, geography and weather), pirates base 
their decision making on three important factors that explain why piracy exhibits 
pattern of spatial interdependence. This pattern can be described as outbursts of 
activity followed by a contagious period, which is limited in time (within one month) 
and space (within 250 km). After this period, the contagion in the area stops. 
Additionally, successes may drive pirates to return to locations where they failed 
less. Interestingly, the learning process does not exclude the possibility that those 
who recognize the advantages of operating in a location are the same who achieved 
the first success. Practices, which also involve ways of carrying out attacks, may 
diffuse “in virtue of the signal they send” (Gilardi 2016), rate of success in this case. 
Unfortunately, the data available does not allow distinguishing among groups and 
identifying contagion processes due to observational learning. 
The identification of the sources of clustering has crucial implications for 
counter-piracy policy. Counter-crime interventions usually refer to hotspot maps to 
identify areas considered to be at risk. However, a static map of hotspot may result 
in misinformed strategies. Indeed, not all hotspots are constant over time and it is 
easy to misinterpret a temporary high concentration of piracy with a stable hotspot 
(Johnson and Bowers 2004; Johnson et al 2008). The near-repeat analysis, for 
example, has shown that an “originator” event may start a chain of correlated attacks 
only because of event-dependency and contagion. This means that a hotspot may 
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be the result of an occasional outburst of activity following a precipitating event but 
this does not imply that the areas is always at high risk of piracy. In such instances, 
constant patrolling by navy forces (as in the transit corridor) is not efficient, whereas 
rapid interventions to disrupt activities are more appropriate. Stable hotspots, on the 
other hand, record high intensity of piracy over time, not just occasionally. This is 
due not to contagion but to location characteristics that are particularly favourable for 
piracy. Such hotspots are localized around the Gulf of Aden and Northern Somali 
coast, where concentration of piracy is reported throughout the whole 2005-2013 
period. Hence, the distinction between risk heterogeneity and contagion made in this 
article is extremely policy-relevant and necessary to properly inform intervention 
strategies. Understanding the determinants of piracy clustering in specific locations 
is central for planning appropriate counter-piracy strategies as it would allow to 
distinguish between areas that needs to be constantly patrolled and those where the 
risk of attack is temporarily heightened for a limited period. 
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1 The distinction between diffusion as conditioned behaviour and contagion as 
imitative behaviour are from Midlarsky et al (1980). Since main argument made in 
the article is that pirates behaviour is indeed purposive rather than random, the term 
contagion is preferred and used throughout the article. 
2 For a discussion of differences, see Maggetti and Gilardi 2015. 
3 In the manuscript, the term common exposure is borrowed from Franzese and 
Hayes to indicate “similar exogenous internal/domestic or external/foreign stimulus” 
(2008:4). In the same vein, common exposure is implied in Buhaug and Gleditsch 
(2008:215) when the authors mention “similar distribution of relevant country 
characteristics” associated with the emergence of the phenomenon of interest. 
4 Unfortunately, distinguishing between contagion driven by learning from one’s own 
experience from observational learning (Bandura 1973) is impossible with existing 
piracy data. Such data does not identify piracy groups and/or networks carrying out 
attacks. 
5 Notice that attacks are defined as attempted or successful in the IMB and ASAM 
reports depending on whether pirates managed to either board or hijack a vessel. 
6 For example, EUNAFOR reports four rescued vessels on 01/01/2011, namely two 
tugs, a chemical tanker, an oil tanker. Similarly, IMB records five incidents on the 
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same date, four of which involving exactly the same type of vessels. A fifth vessel is 
reported as hijacked by the IMB and, consistently, is recorded as pirated in the 
EUNAVFOR. 
7 This includes all casualties reported in ACLED within coastal Somali second order 
administrative units (Global Administrative Units http://www.gadm.org ).   
8 Available here: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/maritimeforum/en/node/1473  
9 The model estimates two separate equations, one for the data-generating process 
of the zeros and another for the positive counts. The inflation equation is a logistic 
model for 0s, the other model is a negative binomial. So the two equations are: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (Pr (𝒀𝑖𝑡 = 0)) = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝛾1𝒁𝑖𝑡 
𝑁𝐵 (Pr (𝒀𝑖𝑡 > 0)) = exp  (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 +  𝛽1𝑿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑾𝑖𝑡)   
 
Where 𝒁𝑖𝑡 are covariates for inflation stage (only density in this case), 𝑿𝒊𝒕 is a vector 
of the main independent variables (Table I) and 𝑾𝒊𝒕 are the set of control variables. 
10 Recall that the inflate equation predicts the likelihood of 0s. 
11 Software for Near-Repeat analysis: http://www.cla.temple.edu/cj/misc/nr/  
 
